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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
MARY HATHAWAY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.JAY L. MARX, FLOYD A.
MARX, d/b/a CARBON
ANIMAL BY-PRODUCTS
COMPANY, and
LUEY HADDOCK,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
11030

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the plaintiff-appellant
against the defendants-respondents to recover for
the personal injuries to said plaintiff-appellant resulting from an automobile collision.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable Judge
Joseph E. Nelson, sitting with a jury. The jury
brought in a verdict of no cause of action. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial
which, after argument by counsel for the parties
and submission of Memorandums of Law, was denied.
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in ten ti on of making a left turn across said highway
onto the dirt portion of the Lake Boren Road which
'
intersected with Highway 40 and ran in an easterly
and westerly direction. As respondents' truck approched the intersection, the turn signals were opera ting (TR 126), indicating a left-hand turn. As he
began his left turn, the plaintiff's vehicle, which was
attempting to pass him on the left, collided with the
respondents' truck, resulting in the alleged injuries
to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, along with her children, was also southbound on Highway 40. As she
approached the respondents' truck, which was moving at a slow rate of speed, she attempted to pass
on the left side in the northbound lane of travel,
during which attempt the collision occurred. Had
she stayed in the southbound lane, she would have
avoided the respondents' truck (TR 128).
The point of impact was in the northbound lane
of traffic and within the confines of the intersection
of U.S. 40 with the Lake Boren Road. See plaintiff's
Exhibits 1 and 2.
The Lake Boren Road is asphalt west of the
internection and dirt east of the intersection. U.S.
Highway ,10 is generally a two-lane highway, one
northbound lane and one southbound lane; however,
in the area of the intersection where the collision
occurred, U.S. 40 is a four-lane highway inasmuch
8,s two separate and distinctly marked acceleration
and deceleration lanes have been placed on each side
of the road for cars to enter onto U.S. 40 and exit
3

U.S. 40 from the Lake Boren Road either from the
east or west (TR 14-15). The acceleration and deceleration lanes commence approximately one-tenth
of a mile or 600 feet north of the Lake Boren intersection (TR 11, and also see plaintiff's Exhibit 4).
The acceleration and deceleration lanes are marked
with a broken white line. The lane marking stripes
do not continue across the area encompassing the
Lake Boren intersection but continue on the other
side of the intersection (see plaintiff's Exhibit 4).
Both the dirt and paved roads intersect Highway
40 at 90° angles, and stop signs are located at the
intersection of both the dirt road and the paved road
with U.S. Highway 40 (see plaintiff's Exhibits 5
and 3 and TR 16) . North of the intersection, from
which direction the plaintiff was traveling, there is
a rise in the topography over which U.S. 40 passes.
The Lake Boren Road intersection is visible from
that rise, which is approximately a half mile away
from the intersection (TR 34 and 67). As the plaintiff proceeded over the rise, she could see the intersection (TR 34) and the widened out portion of the
highway (TR 67) .
Both the paved portion and the dirt portion of
the Lake Boren Road were traveled by the public;
however, the paved portion was traveled more frequently, especially in the fishing season (TR 18-19).
During the voir dire of the jury, it was discovered that one of the prospective jurors, Reed Stansfield, was an eye witness to the accident and was
,1

accordingly dismissed from jury duty. He was subsequently put on the stand by the defendants and
testified that he was behind the plaintiff and defendant at the time the collision occurred, that he
definitely saw the defendant's signal lights operating, that the defendant had commenced his turn and
was in the northbound lane of traffic when the collision occurred, and that had the plaintiff stayed in
her lane of traffic a collision would not have occurred.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE E V I D E N C E PRESENTED CLEARLY
PROVIDES SUFFICIENT BASIS TO SUPPORT
A CONCLUSION BY THE JURY THAT THE
INTERSECTION OF THE PAVED LAKE BOREN ROAD AND THE DIRT ROAD WITH U.S.
HIGHWAY 40 WAS AN INTERSECTION AS
DEFINED BY THE S TATU TE S OF THE
STATE OF UTAH.

It should first be noted that appellant's Points
I and II will be treated jointly under respondents'
Point I herein.

The issues as framed by appellant's Points I
and II are not a full and complete statement of the
issue. The only possible question arising out of the
trial in connection with the negligence of the plaintiff for passing within an intersection or within 100
feet thereof as provided in Utah Code Annotated,
41-6-58 is whether or not there is sufficient evidence to' support a verdict by the jury that said in5

tersection was in fact an "intersection," as defined
in the Utah statutes and as contemplated in the
above-cited provision. Of course, there is no way of
knowing that the jury even considered this as an element in finding against the plaintiff; however, for
the purposes of argument we shall assume that the
basis of the jury verdict was the negligence of the
plaintiff for passing within an intersection or within 100 feet thereof. The appellant in her Point II
merely reiterates her point in Point I, that the meeting of the U.S. Highway 40 and the dirt and paved
roads was not an intersection. Obviously, the court
was justified in giving an instruction concerning the
possible negligence of the plaintiff passing at an intersection if there was any evidence to substantiate
the fact that it was an intersection and that she
had passed within 100 feet of the intersection. See
Adamson vs. United Mine Workers, 3 Utah 2nd 37,
177 Pac. 2nd 972 ( 1954) in regards to the "any
evidence" rule. However, before we take up the factual question it should also be pointed out that appellant's Point II is misleading in that it attempts to
give the impression that the court instructed as
a matter of law that an intersection did exist at that
point. The instructions read as a whole and not out of
context as the appellant places them shows what the
court obviously meant to do was to present to the
jury the question of whether or not there was an
intersection, and if so, whether or not the plaintiff
had attempted to pass within the confines of the
6

intersection or within 100 feet thereof. The instructions as fully given are as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 5
'"Even though you find the proposition set
forth in the next proceeding instruction in
favor of the plaintiff, nevertheless, the claim
of the plaintiff may be barred by contributory
negligence on her part.
"Before contributory negligence would preclude plaintiff's recovery, the defendant has
the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that the two propositions are
true:
PROPOSITION NO. 1
"That the plaintiff was negligent in the
operation of her automobile immediately prior
to the collision in one or more of the following
particulars :
(a) Plaintiff drove at a speed which was
greater than was reasonable and prudent under the circumstances ;
(b) Plaintiff attempted to pass to the left
of a vehicle at an intersection when it was
unlawful to do so;
( c) Plaintiff failed to yield the right of
way to defendant's vehicle;
( d) Plaintiff failed t~ maintain a .reasonable lookout for other vehicles on the highway.
PROPOSITION NO. 2
"That the negligence of the plaintiff, if
7

any, proximately contributed in producing her
.
own injuries and damage.
"If you find the foregoing propositions
against the plaintiff, she cannot recover."
INSTRUCTION NO. 16
''The laws of this state provide that the
driver of any vehicle overtaking another vehicle proceeding in the same direction shall
pass at a safe distance to the left thereof and
shall not again drive to the right side of the
roadway until safely clear of the overtaken
vehicle.
"The driver shall, when reasonably necessary to insure safe operation, give an audible
warning with his horn, but shall not otherwise
use such horn.
"No vehicle shall at any time be driven to
the left side of the roadway when approaching the crest of a grade or upon a curve in a
highway where the driver's view is obstructed within such distance as to create a hazard
in the event another vehicle might approach
from the opposite direction or when approaching within 100 feet of or traversing any intersection.
"The driver of a motor vehicle shall not
follow another vehicle more closely than is
reasonable and prudent having due regard to
the speed of such vehicle, the traffic upon and
the condition of the highway.
"The driver of any vehicle upon a highway,
before turning from a direct course or moving
right or left upon a roadway, shall first see
that the movement can be made with reason8

able safety and whenever the operation of another vehicle may be affected by such move~e!lt shall give .a signal as required plainly
v1s1ble to the driver of such other vehicle of
the intention to make such movement. The
signal herein required shall be given either
by means of the hand and arm in the manner
herein specified or by approved mechanical
electrical signal device, and whenever the signal is given by means of the hand and arm the
driver shall indicate his intention by extending the hand and arm horizontally from and
beyond the left side of the vehicle.
"A failure to comply with the foregoing
requirements would constitute negligence."
In light of the instructions as given, it is obvious that the instructions merely stated the possible
alternatives of negligence which the jury could find,
and did not instruct the jury, as the appellant asserts, that there was as a matter of law an intersection at the point of the accident.
However, the evidence and the pleadings on file
herein obviously constituted sufficient evidence upon
which a jury could find that the meeting of U.S.
Highway 40 with the Lake Boren paved and dirt
road was an intersection, and that that evidence was
also sufficient to justify the court in finding as a
matter of law that it was an intersection, had the
court been so inclined to do so.
The verdict need only be supported by some
competent evidence. The requirement of some competent evidence for that point was clearly satisfied
9

by the testimony which established the existence of
the acceleration and deceleration lanes which extended approximately one-tenth of a mile in both directions from the intersection of U.S. Highway 40 and
the Lake Boren paved and dirt roads. The appellant
would have the court believe that there were no indications of an intersection and no markings prohibiting passing in that area. The basis of that erroneous assumption appears to be derived from the
appellant's reading of the case of Douglas vs. Gigandet, 8 Utah 2nd 245, 332 Pac. 2nd 932 (1958).
A close examination of that case will show that it does
not say what appellant would have it say. In that
case the defendant, who was the passing vehicle, had
filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff. The trial
court entered a no cause of action against all parties.
The defendant appealed on the grounds that it was
error to instruct that the defendant had a duty to
use due care to observe that the vehicle of the plaintiff was approaching at a point at which a side road
departed from the highway and also in instructing
that the defendant had no right to attempt to pass
the plaintiff's vehicle at an intersection. The court
held there that the Peters Point Road was not a
highway or road, and therefore could not meet the
statutory definition of an intersection. That was the
extent of the holding of the case. In the court's discussion leading up to its conclusion, the court indicated that there was nothing to indicate a turnoff
road from the highway and no markers showing
that a road left the highway anywhere in the area.
l ()

From this statement of fact the plaintiff appears
to evolve a specific test in determining the existence
of an intersection. It appears to respondent that the
supreme court did not intend such statement as the
test, and certainly not as an exclusive test. But even
if such statement were the test, the present situation
would still fall within that definition since the acceleration and deceleration lanes were an obvious marking on the road from which every observant motorist could conclude that there was a special situation
in that area of U.S. Highway 40 allowing for the
entrance and exit of vehicles from either side of the
Lake Boren Road (TR 34). The appellant herself
testified that when she was at the crest of the hill
to the north she could see from that point the widened portion of the road in front of her.
The testimony of the police officer shows that
the Lake Boren Road to the west of Highway 40
was a paved county road which was publicly traveled and a maintained highway and that stop signs
were placed on the east and west sides of the intersection of U.S. Highway 40 and the Lake Boren
Roads. He also testified that the dirt portion of the
Lake Boren Road, which proceeded east from Highway 40 also was publicly traveled, although not as
much as Highway 40 or the paved portion of the
Lake Boren Road. Of course, the fact that the dirt
and paved portions of the Lake Boren Road were not
used to the extent of Highway 40 is not in any way
determinative of their status. In th~ present case the
11

evidence shows that the two intersecting roads, U.S.
Highway 40 and the paved and dirt portion of the
Lake Boren Road, both came within the definition
of a road or highway as set forth in the Utah Code
Annotated 1953, 41-6-7:
"(a) Street or Highway. The entire width
between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is
open to the use of the public for purposes of
vehicular travel."
An examination of the cases set forth in 53 ALR
2nd 861 show that such a road as the Lake Boren
Road, where it is partially paved, publicly maintained, and publicly used, is within the classification of
a highway or street for the purposes of this lawsuit.
Once it is determined that the Lake Boren Road is a
highway or road within the statutory contemplation,
the problem faced in Doiiglas vs. Gigandet has been
resolved.
The statutes of the State of Utah define an intersection as being :
"The area embraced within the prolongation or connection of the lateral curblines, or,
if none, then the lateral boundary lines of the
roadways of two highways which join one another at, or approximately at, right angles, or
the area within which vehicles traveling upon
different highways joining at any other angle
come in conflict." Utah Code Annotated 1953,
41-6-8
U.S. Highway 40 and the Lake Boren Road, being
roads or highways under the statutory definition,
their connection is by definition an intersection
12

without further proof. However, even if we were to
accept the proposition of the plaintiff that an intersection must also have signs and markings so indicating the intersection of roads, the evidence in this
case establishes such signs and markings: the widened highway extended on both sides of the intersection with clearly defined acceleration and deceleration lanes proceeding from the intersecting Lake
Boren Road, and the existence of stop signs on both
sides of U.S. Highway 40 where the dirt and paved
portions of the road intersect. It is obvious that any
driver attentive to the conditions in front of him
as he came over the rise north of the intersection
would observe these markings and signs delineating
the existence of the two intersecting roads.
The appellant in her Point I attempts to assert
that there is no intersection within the statutory
contemplation unless the Utah Highway Department
has marked the intersection according to the Manual
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and
Highways published by the United States Department of Commerce. First of all, the Manual, which
appellant freely quotes from in her Brief, was never
presented as evidence in this case, and is now being asserted on appeal by the appellant. The Manual
merely suggests procedures which the Highway Department should adopt. However, it is not in any
way connected with the statutory definition of an
intersection, and furthermore it is incompetent evidence before the Court at this time. The Court on
13

many occasions has held that evidence not presented
in the case prior to appeal was incompetent and
should not be considered on appeal. Cooper vs. Forresters Underwriters, Inc., 257 Pac. 2nd 540, 123
Utah 215, where the court held that it could not look
dehors the record on appeal and consider facts stated
in briefs but absent from the official record. And
also in the case of Watkins vs. Simonds, 385 Pac.
2nd 154, 14 Utah 2nd 406, the court held that the
appellate court could not consider facts stated in
briefs which may be true but which are not present
in the official record. The same was held also in the
case of Reliable Furniture Company vs. Fidelity &
Guaranty Insitrance Underwriters, Inc., 380 Pac.
2nd 135, 14 Utah 2nd 169. Respondents concede that
the applicable Utah statutes, which the appellant
cites, are properly presented to the Court; however,
the Manual carries no such status and therefore is
improper in the appellant's Brief and should be disregarded. The appellant argues in her Point I that
the intersection was not marked as the Highway Department may have marked other intersections. The
obvious answer to this is that the actions of the
State Road Commission do not control the question
of whether an intersection exists as defined in the
previously cited statute. The State Road Commission
has been delegated authority over the control of traffic throughout the state, and how they carry out
their obligation is not determinative of the issue before the Court.
14

The respondents contention, therefore, is that
the Lake Boren Road was obviously a public highway, that it created an intersection where it intersected with Highway 40, and that the existence of
stop signs and the acceleration and deceleration
lanes is additional evidence of such intersection.
It is also interesting to note that the appellant
apparently sees this intersection question as a lastminute device to overturn the verdict of the jury,
for it appears that prior to the trial the appellant
had no doubts as to it being an intersection. In the
plaintiff's Complaint in Paragraph Three, the appellant stated:

"That at all times herein alleged, the intersection of Lake Boren Road and U.S. Highway
40 is an intersection approximately ten miles
west of Roosevelt, Utah in Duchesne County,
Utah. (Emphasis ours)
And in Paragraph Four of said Complaint, the plaintiff stated:
"That on or about the 27th day of June, 1961
at approximately 11 :30 A.M. plaintiff was
traveling west on U.S. Highway 40 approaching the Lake Boren Road or intersection and
the defendant Luey Haddock was traveling
west ahead of plaintiff; ... " (Emphasis ours)
In the trial of the action the appellant's counsel frequently referred to the ~'intersection," and now the
appellant is in the precarious position of questioning
on appeal whether the jury was entitled to consider
15

the intersection as an intersection. And as to Point
:rI previously discussed, the appellant is also in the
peculiar position of complaining of the court's instructions wherein reference was made to an intersection, when in fact the appellant had herself submitted a proposed Instruction No. 1, which stated
in part:
"That on the 27th day of June, 1961, at approximately 11 :30 o'clock A.M. plaintiff was
driving west on U.S. Highway 40 and approaching the intersection of Lake Boren
Road, Duchesne County."
Had plaintiff's instruction been given, would the
plaintiff now be alleging that it was error to give
that instruction? And also note plaintiff's Instruction No. 2, which was given in substance by the court
in Instruction No. 6, which stated in part:
" ... It is likewise negligence for the driver of
a motor vehicle on a public highway to make
a left-hand turn when it is unsafe to do so by
reason of a vehicle passing to the left or to
commence to make a left turn from a public
highway to an intersection to fail to see a vehicle on the highway there to be seen."
It appears obvious to the respondents that the
junction of the Lake Boren Road and U.S. High- ,
way 40 was an intersection within the contemplation
of the law, that it was properly so considered by the
jury and even the plaintiff until the jury had returned with its verdict.
16

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL B A S E D ON JURY MISCONDUCT,
THERE BEING NEITHER COMPETENT EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT OF SUCH MISCONDUCT NOR A SHOWING OF PREJUDICE
TO THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE.

Appellant in her Point III makes a contention
which is clearly contrary to the well-established law
in the State of Utah in connection with jury misconduct. She appears to allege that the misconduct
was on the part of the foreman of the jury in stating
to the jurors while deliberating in the jury room
that he had driven by the scene of the accident shortly after the accident and had seen there Mr.
Stansfield, who was one of the defendants' witnesses. Plaintiff at the time of the motion for new trial
did not in any way support her contention of jury
misconduct but based her motion merely upon her
own assertion of such fact as she does in this appeal.
The fact alone that no affidavits or any other type
of evidence is before the trial court or this Court is
sufficient to defeat appellant's contentions in her
Point III. Respondents have previously in their Point
I cited the Utah authorities for the proposition that
evidence not before the trial court is not properly
before the Supreme Court. In this situation there is
not any evidence other than the hearsay and selfserving assertions of the appellant.
17

Respondents note, howeve1·, that even had the
appellant submitted affidavits to the trial court supporting the allegations of jury misconduct it is clear
under the Utah law that such affidavits also would
be incompetent evidence of such misconduct. In
Rule 59 (A) 2 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
the policy of the State of Utah as to impeaching jury
verdicts is set down; and there it is provided that
jury misconduct is provable, and then only by affidavit, in two situations: where there has been a quotient or chance verdict, and where the verdict is a
result of bribery. It was early established in the
Utah jurisprudence that it was contrary to the public policy and the statutes of the State of Utah to
allow the verdict of a jury to be impeached fo1· jury
misconduct after is was entered unless it came within
the two above-prescribed exceptions. People vs.
Flynn, 75 Utah 378, 26 Pac. 1114 (1891); Horner
vs. Interrnoimtain Abstract C01npany, 9 Utah 193,
33 Pac. 700; H epw01'th vs. Covey Bros. Aniusernent
Conipany, 97 Utah 205, 91 Pac. 2nd 507 ( 1939);
Morrison vs. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 Pac. 2nd 772
(1943); Wheat vs. Denver & R. G. W.R. Cornpany,
122 Utah 418, 250 Pac. 2nd 932 (1952); and the
latest affirmance of this rule is in the case of Srnith
vs. Barnett, 17 Utah 2nd 240, 408 Pac. 2nd 709
(1965).
The appellant has failed to show that the alleged misconduct p1·ejudiced the verdict against her. In
the case of Redd vs. Airiooy Motor Coach Lines, Inc.,
18

104 Utah 9, 137 Pac. 2nd 374 (1943), this Court
stated on page 22 of the Utah Reports:
"In denying the motion for new trial on the
ground of misconduct on the part of the jury,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion,
even assuming that on the showing made a
contrary ruling could be sustained."
Respondents feel further argument is not necessary along these lines inasmuch as it is clear that
in the first place there being no competent evidence
before the trial court or before this Court of misconduct, such issue is therefore non-existent. However, it is obvious that even assuming that such misconduct did occur and also assuming that the plaintiff had proof of such misconduct, it would nevertheless be incompetent evidence; and under the undisputed law of the State of Utah, the verdict would
stand, and the trial court would, under the rule in
the Redd case, be sustained in its denial of the appellant's motion for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
There is clearly no basis for a new trial upon
the grounds raised by the appellant. The issue of
misconduct is obviously improperly before the Court
and is asserted without any basis. The issue concerning the appellant's allegations concerning the intersection merely resolves itself down to whether there
was any evidence upon which the jury could find
19

that it was an intersection, assuming they did. The
bulk of the appellant's argument under Point I is
also improperly before the Court inasmuch as it was
not evidence before the trial court at any stage of
the proceedings and therefore should not be considered on appeal. The evidence as set forth shows that
there was an intersection at the junction of U.S. 40
and the Lake Boren Roads, that this intersection
was obvious to any reasonable driver from at least
one-tenth of a mile away, and that it was indicated
by the clearly marked acceleration and deceleration
lanes and stop signs on both sides of the Lake Boren
Road. The fact that the Lake Boren Road obviously
met the test of being a public road or highway by
definition makes its junction with Highway 40 an
intersection within the contemplation of the Utah
Law, and the above-mentioned markings and signs
supplement the basis for finding that the intersection was an "intersection." Respondents also contend that the appellant cannot claim error in regard
to the instructions for the reason that in her pleadings she has pleaded that the intersection was an
intersection at all times and in fact asked for instructions from the court which referred to the junc- '
tion as an intersection.
Respondents respectfully submit that the appellant's contentions for a new trial and now for relief
20

on appeal are groundless and that the verdict of the
jury and the trial court's denial of the motion for a
new trial should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON

& GARRETT

by W. BRENT WILCOX
520 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for
Respondents
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